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Standard of Judicial Review for Administrative




Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress shall have the power
"to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."1  Furthermore,
Congress holds exclusive power in establishing and maintaining
tariffs.' As such, Congress is constitutionally empowered to
establish tariffs and conduct the international economic relations
of the United States.' The nascent country found involvement in
international commerce paramount in her emergence on the global
scene. Evidence of this concern is that the Tariff Act of 1789,
signed by President George Washington on July 4 th of that year,4
became the second bill enacted by the American federal
legislature.' On July 31, 1789, Congress established the United
States Customs Service to further "administer and examine"
customs implementation.6 This administrative agency, coupled
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International Affairs from the Elliot School of International Affairs at George
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currently is pursuing an L.L.M. in International and Comparative Law at the Georgetown
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1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
3 Jeannette Schiller, The Political System Governing Foreign Trade in the United
States, in U.S. TRADE BARRIERS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 8 (Eberhard Grabitz & Armin von
Bogdandy eds., 1991).
4 Id. at 36.
5 THOMAS F. KLASEN, FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT: A LEGAL GUIDE § 6.02
(2d ed. 1987).
6 Schiller, supra note 3, at 36. The July 31, 1789 Act was supplemented by the
Act of 4 August 1790. These initial statutes were supplanted in 1799 by a "much more
detailed and comprehensive customs administrative act." PATRICK C. REED, THE ROLE
OF FEDERAL COURTS IN U.S. CUSTOMS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 40 (1997). The
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with judicial review of its decisions, is the focus of this paper.
While Congress holds legislative authority in conducting foreign
commerce, in reality, of course, that power is delegated to the
federal executive, the judiciary, and administrative agencies
statutorily entrusted to carry out the customs and international
trade laws of the United States.7
The Twentieth Century witnessed the most progressive
evolution of the Customs-judiciary dynamic. Prior to 1890, the
[N]ineteenth [C]entury had "shown that there were no specialized
courts for handling customs litigation, and that the method of
obtaining judicial review evolved in an unplanned and
unsystematic manner."8 During the first 100 years of the United
States, customs disputes were under the judicial review of the
federal courts of general jurisdiction.9
1799 Act "served as the foundation for the system of customs administration throughout
the nineteenth century and, in fact, well into the twentieth century." Id. Among the
duties and authority of the Customs Service were to "receive entries.., of the goods,
wares and merchandise imported [through the port]; . . . estimate the duties payable
thereupon. . . receive all monies paid for duties, and take all bonds for securing the
payment thereof .... Id.
Of considerable importance in the twentieth century was the Tariff Act of 1930, or the
infamous Smoot-Hawley Act, historically attributed to inducing the Great Depression, as
well as the system promulgated in 1962 introducing the Tariff Schedules of the United
States (TSUS). KLASEN, supra note 5, § 6.02.
7 REED, supra note 6, at 15. As noted by Senator Julius Caesar Burrows of
Michigan in 1909:
While ... Congress is popularly believed the determinative body of tariff rates
and schedules, as a matter of fact the courts and the customs administrative
officers finally, in a great number if not great majority of cases, determine these
matters .... By reason of interpretation and construction of [the statutory]
provisions[,] whole schedules and numerous rates have been changed greatly
from the supposed, if not manifest, purpose of Congress . . . . That
administration and judicial construction of a tariff law determine its character
has been the history of every such law.
44 CONG. REC. 4192 (1909), reprinted in REED, supra note 6, at 15-16.
8 REED, supra note 6, at 66. For a detailed overview of the legislative and judicial
tumult of the nineteenth century regarding customs law, see id. at 37-67. Involvement
by the judiciary "did not follow a structured or a systematic institutional framework.
Individual problems were handled as they arose, and there was no specific court or
tribunal to adjudicate tariff and customs disputes." ISAAC UNAH, THE COURTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 16-17 (1998).
9 UNAH, supra note 8, at 17.
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With the advent of the Customs Administration Act of 1890,10
Congress provided the foundational structure promoting the "first
key action toward the historical evolution of U.S. trade courts."'"
The 1890 Act created the Board of General Appraisers, a nine-
member, quasi-judicial administrative body under the Department
of the Treasury.12 The Board's "primary function was to 'examine
and decide' cases involving decisions of the U.S. Customs Service
concerning protests against tariffs levied upon imported
merchandise."13
Eventually, the Board of General Appraisers was dissolved in
1926, with functional power transferred to the U.S. Customs
Court.' 4 This shift was only nominal in nature; "these changes
were more symbolic than substantive ... because they pertained
largely to the nomenclature."' 5  Fundamentally, the jurisdiction
and function of the Customs Court were tantamount to that of the
Board. 16  Unlike the Board, however, members of the Customs
10 Customs Administration Act of 1890, ch. 407, 26 Stat. 131.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 UNAH, supra note 8, at 17. Under the 1890 Act, classification decisions by the
Board were "subject to judicial review in the circuit courts, with appeals to the circuit
court of appeals and then the Supreme Court." REED, supra note 6, at 84.
14 UNAH, supra note 8, at 17. The Board of General Appraisers was "finding that
its title was a source of confusion, since most persons assumed that it was an
administrative body. More important, this impression was hindering its operation."
REED, supra note 6, at 108. The problem was that" '[s]ome foreign governments refuse
to honor commissions to take testimony issued by the board upon the ground ... that it
bears the name of a board and not the title of a court.' " REED, supra note 6, at 108,
quoting S. REP. No. 781, at 1-2 (1926).
15 UNAH, supra note 8, at 17.
16 Id. Appeals from the Customs Court went to the U.S. Court of Customs Appeals
(CCA) created in 1909. REED, supra note 6, at 88. The CCA, a five-judge court located
in Washington D.C., exercised " 'exclusive jurisdiction to review by appeal ... final
decisions by a Board of General Appraisers' [renamed the Customs Court] on issues of
law and fact in cases involving the classification of merchandise and the rate of duty
imposed on it." Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 28, 36 Stat. 11, 106.
In 1929, the CCA was given broader jurisdictional powers as well as a new name. See
Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475. The CCA's "new jurisdiction consisted in
appeals from the U.S. Patent Office in cases relating to the registration of patents and
trademarks; its new name was the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [CCPA]." 45
Stat. 1475. It must be noted that prior to the 1980 Act and the creation of the Court of
International Trade, infra, only the importer, consignee of the imported merchandise, or
persons paying duties had the right to file protests with the Customs Courts. Richard A.
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Court became justices.17 This "produced a significant change of
perspective in the institutional framework of customs litigation,
for it changed what had been an administrative body into a judicial
body."' 8 This shift in institutional role-playing from administrative
body to court came to the fore a mere three years after the
inception of the customs court.
In 1929, the United States Supreme Court tackled the issues
regarding the actual constitutional status of the customs juridical
regime. The controversy in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,9 was
whether the authority of the customs courts was based under either
Article I or Article III of the Constitution. ° In short, the high
Cohen, The New United States Court of International Trade, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 277, 279 (1981). Standing in certain aspects of customs law litigation was eventually
expanded under the Trade Act of 1974, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, and the
Customs Courts Act of 1980. See id. at 287; UNAH, supra note 8.
Even if one gained access to the court, there were a number of special
procedures which could present difficulties for the unwary. The most
noteworthy was the so-called dual burden of proof. [Under this system] to
succeed in [customs] actions, the plaintiff was not only required to prove that
the Customs Service's determination had been incorrect but also had to bear the
burden of proving that its own alternative classification or valuation was
correct.
Id. at 280.
The doctrine of dual burden of proof was abolished by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873 (C.A. Fed. 1984); see
also REED, supra note 6, at 258. In this case, the court held that the
trial court cannot determine the correct result simply by dismissing the
importer's alternative as incorrect. It must consider whether the government's
classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the
importer's alternative. In some cases, the government's classification may be
so patently incorrect that the importer can overcome the presumption of
correctness without producing a more satisfactory alternative. In other cases,
the importer's alternative may have faults and yet still be a better classification
than the government's. In either case, the court's duty is to find the correct
result by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.
733 F.2d at 878.
17 REED, supra note 6, at 109.
18 Id. at 109-10.
19 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
20 Under Article I, legislative courts are creatures of Congress and, hence, derive
their powers from congressional mandate. REED, supra note 6, at 112. "The [Customs
Courts were] created by Congress in virtue of its power to lay and collect duties on
imports and to adopt any appropriate means of carrying that power into execution...
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Court found that the Board of General Appraisers, the predecessor
of the Customs Court, was, "although mostly quasi-judicial," 2'
merely an "executive agency" 22 created by Congress, "susceptible
of performance by executive- officers. 2 3  Justice van Devanter
held that the Customs Courts were clearly posited on legislative
and not constitutional, or Article III, authority.24 From a practical
standpoint, the Bakelite decision had little impact on the actual
authority of the Customs Courts as their powers and functions
remained intact. 25 Nevertheless, Congress appeared remiss in its
statutory creation of these courts, through its failure to express its
intent for either Article I or Article III adjudication. As the late
Judge Giles Rich stated, the Bakelite decision "'slapped the
court[s] down.' ,26 In essence, the Supreme Court relegated the
Customs Courts to a purgatorial muddle. "[Bakelite] announced
that the courts' existing status was not as elevated as had been
believed. The Customs Courts occupied an intermediate status
above administrative agencies but clearly below full constitutional
courts. 2 7
Congress's aim to further "greater institutional recognition
2 8
of the customs court system was realized in 1956 when the
[T]he true test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction
conferred." Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 458-59.
In contrast,
it long has been settled that Article III does not express the full authority of
Congress to create courts, and that other articles invest Congress with powers in
the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe them with
functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers into execution.
.. [Article III courts] share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in
[section 2, article III of the Constitution], can be invested with no other
jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office during good behavior, with no
power in Congress to provide otherwise.
279 U.S. at 449.
21 Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 458.
22 Id. at 457.
23 Id. at 458.
24 Id. at 460.
25 REED, supra note 6, at 114.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 UNAH, supra note 8, at 17.
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national legislature passed a statute that declared the Customs
Court to be "established under Article III of the Constitution.... "2 9
The current framework of the customs legal system was
established by 1982. With the Customs Courts Act of 1980,
Congress created the United States Court of International Trade
(CIT).3° The Act provides that the CIT shall "possess all the
powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a
district court of the United States."3 Furthermore, the 1980 Act
authorizes the CIT to "enter money judgments, direct agencies to
conduct further administrative proceedings, and with certain
exceptions, 'order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a
civil action, including but not limited to, declaratory judgments,
29 Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589 § 1, 70 Stat. 532. The congressional declaration
bestowing almost arbitrary Article III status to the Customs Court was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
Further reformation and modernization of the import adjudicatory system occurred
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. REED, supra note 6, at 125-51 (discussion and
analysis of the Customs Courts Act of 1970, the Trade Act of 1974, the Customs
Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, and the Trade Agreements Act of
1979).
30 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980). The CIT
"has been given exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions arising from importation of
goods." Schiler, supra note 3, at 34. Areas of CIT jurisdiction include: 1) review of
prohibitions by customs law to import certain goods; 2) cases of classification of
imported goods under the U.S. tariff schedules; 3) cases concerning reappraisal of the
value of imported merchandise for the determination of an ad valorem duty; 4) review of
the administrative proceedings which initiate antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations, and all final determinations by the Department of Commerce or the
International Trade Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000); see also Schfler, supra
note 3, at 34.
The CIT is composed of nine judges appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Normally, cases are assigned to a single judge by the chief judge. 28 U.S.C. § 253.
While based in New York City, the CIT may conduct trials in "every court throughout
the United States .... In exceptional cases, the court may also hold hearings in foreign
countries." Schiller, supra note 4, at 35.
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 represents an enormous advance in the
evolution of the Customs Court. It expands the jurisdiction and the remedial
powers of the court in a manner which will finally enable the court to dispose of
a broad range of cases in accordance with its [A]rticle III status.
David M. Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International Trade under
the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 471, 472 (1981).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (2000).
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orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and
prohibition.' ,3 2 As prescribed by the 1980 Act, the CIT became a
full-fledged Article III court, on par with federal district courts.3 3
Overall, the CIT became the means through which international
trade litigation in the United States experienced a stability,
uniformity, and harmonization unattainable for the first two
hundred years of this country due to what appeared to be
legislative and judicial ambivalence and experimentation.34
If a party before the CIT is displeased with the outcome of a
decision, the case may be appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).35 This court was created
32 28 U.S.C. § 2643(a)-(c)(1) (2000).
33 "The CIT came to exercise judicial review under a mixed system of import
regulation consisting of tariff laws, import-relief laws, and discretion-oriented import
statutes. In this function, the powers of the CIT are equivalent to those of a district
court." REED, supra note 6, at 177.
The Customs Court's origins as an administrative organ with very limited
functions had significant and lasting impact upon it. Until the 1980 Act, the
court possessed narrowly-defined jurisdiction, unique procedures, and very
limited powers of relief. Most of the actions before the court involved narrow
issues pertaining to the classification and valuation of goods by the United
States Customs Service upon their entry to the United States. The court's
jurisdiction, procedures, and remedial authority reflected this for quite some
time.
Richard A. Cohen, supra note 16, at 278-279.
The CIT has
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes which deal with the classification of
imported merchandise. Because the [Tariff Schedules of the United States]
assign rates of duty according to the nature of the imported article, classification
is critical in determining the amount of duties that are assessed on the imported
merchandise. The legal question presented by classification cases is whether
the United States Customs Service has properly classified the imported
merchandise under the appropriate category of the Tariff Schedules.
The Honorable Edward D. Re, Litigation before the United States Court of International
Trade, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 437, 444 (1981).
34 "[The Customs Courts Act of 1980] creates a comprehensive system of judicial
review of civil suits arising from import transactions. By utilizing the specialized
expertise of the United States Customs Court and the [United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit], the Customs Courts Act ensures national uniformity in the judicial
decision-making process." The Honorable Peter Rodino, Jr., The Customs Courts Act of
1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 459, 469 (1981).
35 The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the CIT. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(5) (2000).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
in 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act.36
Under the current regime, decisions and regulations of the
Customs Service are subject to the scrutiny of the CIT, the CAFC,
and the Supreme Court. The focus of this paper is to examine the
role of administrative law since the New Deal and its relationship
with customs law adjudication. Part I wil discuss briefly the rise
of judicial deference to federal administrative agencies since the
1940s. Part II will analyze the case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
National Resources Defense Council,37 and how it revolutionized
the notion of judicial deference in administrative law. Part III will
discuss the specific application of Chevron to customs law. 38 Parts
IV, V, and VI of this paper will conclude with an analysis of how
two cases, in particular, over the past three years have
promulgated a near schizophrenic series of court decisions, which
could eventually produce a juggernaut of burdensome,
overwhelming, if not superfluous, rule-making for the Customs
Service.
36 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164. This appellate court
was established by
the merger of the CCPA and the U.S. Court of Claims. From the CCPA the
new court received jurisdiction in appeals from the Court of International Trade,
the International Trade Commission, and the Patent and Trademark Office.
From the Court of Claims, it received that Court's appellate functions. The trial
functions of the Court of Claims were assigned to the newly created U.S.
Claims Court (renamed the Court of Federal Claims in 1992), whose decisions
would now be reviewed by the CAFC. The CAFC was also given exclusive
jurisdiction in appeals from district courts in patent cases.
REED, supra note 6, at 178.
In the CAFC, judges sit in rotating panels of three. UNAH, supra note 8, at 20.
In the entire federal judicial system, the Federal Circuit is the only
constitutional court of appeals with a nationwide, as opposed to a territorial,
jurisdiction. It forms the boldest experiment yet in judicial reformation in the
American context. Even though the geographic and subject matter jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit give the court a unique institutional character, its status as
an intermediate court and its practices and procedures are similar or equivalent
to those found in other courts of appeals.
Id.
37 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38 Id.
[Vol. 28
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I. The New Deal and the Rise of Judicial Deference to the
Administrative Agency
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the United States was in the
throes of both the Great Depression and the Second World War. It
was during this period that under the leadership of President
Franklin Roosevelt, this country saw both an increase in the role of
administrative agencies and judicial leniency to the decision-
making processes of these bodies. The New Deal era of ideals,
which pervaded American politics, economics, and law during the
Roosevelt years (1933-1945), witnessed the gradual demise of
judicial activism in a Supreme Court once willing to "[strike]
down as unconstitutional virtually all of the New Deal legislation
that came before it." 9 The increasingly "expansive and expanding
role that the New Deal charted for the federal government was
eventually accepted, both legally and politically."'4 Evidence of
39 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA ix (1992). Mr.
Aman points out that 1935, and in particular, May 27 of that year was "not a good one
for the Roosevelt administration." Id. On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court struck
down New Deal legislation and executive decision-making powers in three cases. In
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court restricted the
President's authority to remove government officials for reasons beyond the scope of
controlling legislation. The Supreme Court struck down a bankruptcy provision of the
Frazier-Lemke Act aimed at protecting farmer-debtors in Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v.. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). Finally, in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the high Court declared unconstitutional the
National Industrial Recovery Act, which granted executive authority to approve
regulations promoting fair competition, a forty-hour work week, and a minimum wage.
Chief Justice Charles Hughes stated that:
We [the Supreme Court] are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the
adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with
which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power
is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is
challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call foi extraordinary remedies. But
the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies
outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not
create or enlarge constitutional power.
295 U.S. at 528.
40 AMAN, supra note 39, at x.
[T]he judicial hands-off approach that typified [the New Deal] was part of a
much larger pattern of change, very much of a piece with the Court's
willingness to let Congress decide how best to deal with the essentially
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this evolution to judicial laissez-faire became fully realized by the
mid-1940s as a decision by the Supreme Court and an act of
Congress laid the foundation of administrative law for the next
forty years. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,4' the United States
Supreme Court, unwilling to give plenary authority to
administrative bodies, did acquiesce a considerable amount of
weight to agency decisions. The Court believed that "although
[the judiciary] makes it own independent decision on what a
statute means, it may nevertheless take an agency's interpretation
into consideration., 42
In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 43  "arguably the most important piece of legislation
economic issues spawned by the Great Depression. It was all part of a deferring
to a Congress that had, in large part, passed the programs demanded by a strong
and popular president .... [J]udicial deference in the context of administrative
law was an attempt to give the New Deal agencies created by Congress at least
a chance to work."
Id. at 8-9.
41 323 U.S. 134 (1944). In this case, the Court upheld the ruling of an agency
Administrator in interpreting certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id The
Court stated that decisions of an administrative agency
do not constitute an interpretation of [an] Act or a standard for judging factual
situations which binds a district court's processes, as an authoritative
pronouncement of a higher court might do. But the [agency's] policies are
made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case .... The fact that the [agency's] policies and standards are not
reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to
respect.
Id. at 139-40.
42 REED, supra note 6, at 278. Justice Robert Jackson stated that:
We [the Supreme Court] consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions
of the [agency] under [the] Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such
a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.
323 U.S. at 140.
43 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (currently codified in
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1982)).
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governing federal regulatory agency policy making." 4 The APA
set forth the fundamental rules of operation for administrative
agencies, including the implementation and definition of
regulatory procedural due process. 45 "As such, it served to codify,
rationalize, unify, clarify, and extend the operating procedures of
all federal agencies."46
The APA was Congress's response to the gradual judicial
trend of passivity, as the late 1930s and early 1940s "were the high
water mark of judicial deference to the administrative process.
Federal courts deferred to administrative agencies on factual,
legal, and even constitutional issues., 47 It appears that the APA's
purpose was to reign in any threats, real or perceived, of unbridled
administrative authority. While the APA is considered to "codify
the previously existing judge-made law in this area[,] . . . [t]he
APA states that 'the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions .... ,48 However, the federal courts declined to
exercise the greater judicial review mandated under the APA. "In
fact, agency interpretations of law rarely received the judicial
scrutiny that the APA itself would allow. 49
Judicial leniency would continue until the 1960s when any
remnants of "deference would disappear as distrust of the
administrative state and of the political branches grew"5 in an
44 McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 181 (1999).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and
the Changing Definition of Pluralism: 1945-1970,53 VAND. L. REv. 1389, 1417 (2000).
48 REED, supra note 6, at 278 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000)).
49 AMAN, supra note 39, at 8. Reuel E. Schiller also noted that:
Though the Court stopped its New Deal-era passivity to agency decision-
making, it nevertheless recognized that agency expertise justified deference to
administrative legal determinations. As the Court held in one of a series of
cases upholding agency statutory interpretations in the late 1940s and early
1950s, " 'cumulative experience' begets understanding and insight by which
judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated."
Schiller, supra note 47, at 1421 (quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S.
344, 349 (1953)).
5o Schiller, supra note 47, at 1421. It must be noted that "[b]etween 1966 and
1981, the administrative bureaucracy grew considerably, both in terms of the number of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG, [Vol. 28
American environment beleaguered by the conflict in Vietnam and
domestic racial and societal strife. The emerging judicial "hard
look"5  approach of increased scrutiny would pervade
administrative law until the revolution which was to occur in
1984.
In regards to customs decisions, the courts, prior to 1984, were
in line with other rulings dealing with federal administrative
agencies, namely, adherence to the Skidmore doctrine of agency
persuasiveness, not deference."2 For example, the former Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, which evolved into the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, asserted that "[1]ong-
established administrative practice may bear on the construction of
new laws and agencies involved and the amount of new regulation these agencies
produced. Both aspects of this growth created a need for greater supervision of the
bureaucracy." AMAN, supra note 39, at 26.
51 In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Fed Communication Comm 'n., 444 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld an
agency decision, "but only after a painstaking review of every factor that the agency had
considered in making its determination." Schiller, supra note 47, at 1422.
The court noted that:
Assuming consistency with law and the legislative mandate, the agency has
latitude not merely to find facts and make judgments, but also to select the
policies deemed in public interest. The function of the court is to assure that the
agency has given reasoned consideration to all material facts and issues. This
calls for insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons
for decision, and identify'the significance of the crucial facts, a course that tends
to assure that the agency's policies effectuate general standards, applied without
unreasonable discrimination .... Its supervisory function calls on the court to
intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the
mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware,
especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really
taken a "hard look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in
reasoned decision-making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental task,
however, the court exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even
though the court would on its own account have made different findings or
adopted different standards. . . . If satisfied that the agency has taken a hard
look at the issues with the use of reasons and standards, the court will uphold its
findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may reasonably
be discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the
agency's findings or reasons.
444 F.2d at 851 (emphasis added).
52 Prior to Chevron, "the Customs Courts used a Skidmore-type approach in which
the agency's interpretation was considered persuasive to the extent that it appeared to
merit it." REED, supra note 6, at 284.
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the tariff laws, [but it is] comparable to other extrinsic aids to
ascertaining legislative intent which come into play when the
construction of a statutory provision is in doubt."53
As a whole, the Customs Courts did not defer to agency
interpretations of classification statutes. 4 While customs officials
made decisions at the port of entry, once contested by a party, the
courts took primacy over the Customs Service's interpretations.
While there was a presumption of correctness, the basic rule was
that the "meaning of a descriptive term used in a tariff act is a
matter of law to be decided by the court..
II. Chevron and the Revolution in Administrative Law
On June 25, 1984, the Supreme Court "worked something of a
revolution in administrative law .... ,56 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.," the Court, in a 6-0
decision,58 radically transformed the role of agency decision-
making and elevated it well beyond the parameters established
under the long-standing Skidmore rule. 9 Until 1984, Skidmore
was the lodestar for judicial interpretation of agency decisions,
53 Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 1352, 1361 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
54 REED, supra note 6, at 283.
55 Am. Express Co. v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 8, 10 (1951). See also Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 649, 653 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984);
Borneo Sumatra Trading Co. v. United States, 31 1 F. Supp. 326 (Cust. Ct. 1970); Kobata
v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 1397 (Cust. Ct. 1971).
56 David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative
Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 332 (2000).
57 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This case involved the judicial interpretation of the term
"stationary source" under certain sections of the Clean Air Act dealing with state output
of pollution. Id. Unfortunately, the Act did not define the term. Before 1981, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a rule defining "stationary source" as a
single pollutant-emitting facility. Id. at 846-47. In 1981, the EPA promulgated a new
rule adopting the so-called "bubble concept," in essence aggregating all polluting
facilities in a given state. Id. at 857. The Supreme Court, reversing the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held that the EPA's new definition
of "stationary source" was reasonable and within its purview of administrative authority.
Id. at 837. See also Hasen, supra note 56, at 330-31.
58 Justices Marshall, O'Connor, and Rehnquist took no part in the decision of this
case. 467 U.S. at 839.
59 Interestingly, the Chevron Court mentions Skidmore once, relegating it to a
footnote. Id. at 865 n. 40.
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invoking a flexible balancing test of administrative reason,
consistency, and thoroughness.60 The Court's contrasting approach
in Chevron was quite stark. The Chevron decision "provides a
very narrow, formalistic reading of statutory language and
congressional intent.' '6' The two-prong test promulgated by the
Court, which in essence "[s]wept aside [the] Skidmore criteria," 62
states that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.63
The Court went on to qualify the ambiguity element of the test
by stating:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there
is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 64
60 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
61 AMAN, supra note 39, at 113. The author goes on to state that:
Only questions involving ultra vires matters are considered fair game by the
Chevron Court .... [T]he Court formalistically construes statutes in a manner
that defers to the agency in the name of presidential deference whenever
Congress has failed to resolve the precise issue. The policymaking area left to
the president and his agents is thus significantly expanded.
Id.
62 Hasen, supra note 56, at 336 (quoting Peter Schuck & Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J.
984, 1024 (1991)).
63 467 U.S. at 842-43.
64 Id. at 843-44. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000)
similarly states:
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Under this test, "[t]he agency is entitled to deference as a
matter of right. Skidmore, in contrast, makes clear that the weight
given to the agency interpretation is always ultimately up to the
court."6 5  Skidmore asserts that an administrative agency is
"entitled to deference only if it earns it."66  Chevron supplants
persuasiveness with reasonable, judicious, and circumspect
deference to agency decision-making and interpretation.67
IlI. The Application of Chevron in Customs Law
In the aftermath of Chevron, the Court of International Trade
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
approached customs classification disputes in fashions ranging
from Chevron deference, to Skidmore respect, to utter disregard.
For example, in Generra Sportswear Co. v. United States,6 8 the
Court applied Chevron deference to the Customs Service's
interpretation of a technically vague duty provision.69 Apparently
[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall...
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.
65 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo L. J. 833,
856 (2001).
66 Id. See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1940).
67 Interestingly, the new administrative deference bestowed by the Supreme Court
in Chevron arguably appears contrary in light of the oft-quoted classic sentence in
Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). In the years following Chevron, it is
clear that the CIT and CAFC adhered to this concept with more enthusiasm than judicial
decisions in other areas of administrative law.
68 905 F.2d 377 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
69 The specific statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a)-(b) (2000), is unclear as to whether or
not quota payments may be included in so-called transaction value. The court held that
Customs's construction of the statute section to include quota charges was valid. See
Generra, 905 F.2d at 379. Relying on Chevron, the court went on to state that since
Congress did not intend for the Customs Service to engage in extensive fact-
finding to determine whether separate charges.., are for the merchandise or for
something else .... [T]he straightforward approach of [section 1401a(b)] is no
doubt intended to enhance the efficiency of Customs's appraisal procedure; it
would be frustrated were we to parse the statutory language in the manner, and
require Customs to engage in the formidable fact-finding task, envisioned by
[appellant].
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
based on the gap-filling prong of the Chevron test,"° the Federal
Court of Appeals gave the impression that the judiciary was about
to embark on producing a line of decisions adhering to the
Supreme Court's ruling of six years earlier. Instead, a strong
reversal ensued, l as Generra quickly became an anomalous
divergence and deference to Customs gradually eroded..
In what appears to be an about-face, the CIT in Sulzer Escher
Wyss, Inc. v. United Statesv" tacitly indicated some degree of
reservation about the ruling in Generra. Buried in a footnote, the
CIT regained the reigns of control in exercising its congressionally
mandated role, and the Court of Appeals took heed. The CIT
stated:
in connection with construction of a valuation statute the Court
of Appeals has held that [Chevron] applies, so that any
permissible construction of the statute by Customs will control
.... It is not clear to what extent this issue was seriously argued
before that court. Congress may have intended a less deferential
approach when a court established to have particular expertise is
construing a statute within its assigned area of expertise.
Furthermore, in construing tariff classification, as opposed to
valuation, provisions, the court must often make factual
determinations regarding the meaning of terms used in a
particular industry. These factual determinations are made in a
trial de novo. Deference to Customs's statutory interpretation in
this context would violate the statutory scheme and decades of
practice.73
Throughout the 1990s, the CIT and CAFC, while recognizing
Chevron, tended to diminish its role in customs law. The situation
appears to be due to a struggle of historical deference: that of the
905 F.2d at 380 (citations omitted).
70 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
71 "Despite the seeming adoption of deferential review in Generra, the CAFC
abandoned this approach in subsequent customs cases." REED, supra note 6, at 287. For
example, in the same year Generra was decided, the court made no mention of Chevron
at all in its ruling against Customs's classification of imported liquid crystals. E.M.
Chems. v. United States, 920 F.2d 910 (C.A. Fed. 1990). See also Nissho lwai Am.
Corp. v. United States, 982 F.2d 505 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declining deference to Customs's
interpretation of transaction value between buyer and seller of subway cars).
72 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 609 (1993).
73 Id. at612n. 6.
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courts versus that of Customs. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1),
decisions of the Customs Service are presumed correct with the
burden falling on the challenging party.74 However, under 28
U.S.C. § 2640(a), the CIT is to render determinations based on the
record made before the court.75 This is merely a codification of
the traditional de novo standard of review afforded the lower
Customs Courts of the past.76 When an appeal is presented at the
Federal Circuit, the judicial review of a classification ruling
generally entails a two-step process of (1) ascertaining the
proper meaning of specific terms within the tariff provision and
(2) determining whether the merchandise at issue comes within
the description of such terms as properly construed. The first
step is a question of law which we review de novo and the
second is a question of fact which we review for clear error.77
This struggle undoubtedly caused friction between Customs
and the judiciary during the last decade. The referential treatment,
74 "[In] any civil action commenced in the Court of International Trade... the
decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the administering authority, or the International
Trade Commission is presumed to be correct. The burden of proving otherwise shall rest
upon the party challenging such decision." 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (2000).
75 "The Court of International Trade shall make its determinations upon the basis of
the record made before the court ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a) (2000).
76 REED, supra note 6, at 176.
Another tool of review for the CIT is in 28 U.S.C. § 2643(b), which provides:
If the Court of International Trade is unable to determine the correct decision on
the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court may order a
retrial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order such further administrative or
adjudicative procedures as the court considers necessary to reach the correct
decision.
77 Nidec Corp. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting
Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1054, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Totes,
Inc. v. United States, 69 F.3d 495, 497-98 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Customs classification cases, which represent the bulk of customs cases before
the Federal Circuit... can present both issues of law and fact. The meaning of
a tariff classification term is a question of law, which the Federal Circuit
theoretically reviews de novo. The determination whether the merchandise in
question comes within a particular tariff provision, as properly interpreted, is a
question of fact. Questions of fact are not reviewed de novo, but are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard.
Herbert C. Shelley, et al., The Standard of Review Applied by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U. L.
REv. 1749, 1818 (1996).
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with an absence of deference, to Chevron persisted. In Crystal
Clear Industries v. United States, the Court of Appeals, in
affirming a decision of the CIT, went so far as to assert that
Chevron does not even apply to routine classification disputes.78
Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States continued this judicial
abandonment of Chevron in customs cases.79 The appellate court,
reaffirming that interpretations of classification terms are
questions of law reviewable de novo, discounted Customs's
arguments pleading that deference is mandated both judicially and
legislatively. The Court stated:
Customs ... argues that its classification decisions should be
entitled to deference based on either the statutory presumption
of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1994) or the
Chevron doctrine. . . . We do not find either argument
meritorious here, where the sole issue concerns the proper scope
of a classification term. . . . [W]e squarely held that the
statutory presumption of correctness under § 2639 is irrelevant
where there is no factual dispute between the parties ... [W]e
also agree with the line of cases from the Court of International
Trade that hold that the Court of International Trade's statutory
mandate to find the correct result in a classification case is
logically incompatible with Chevron deference. . . . We
reiterate here that no Chevron deference applies to classification
decisions by Customs. In sum, no deference attaches to
Customs's classification decisions either under 28 U.S.C. § 2639
or under Chevron, where there are no disputed issues of material
fact.8°
For the remainder of the 1990s, the courts adhered to their
control of classification determination. It must be stressed that
Customs did not necessarily lose in the multiple classification
cases presented before the CIT and CAFC. Rather, these courts,
while reaching conclusions in favor of Customs, refused to give a
perceived automatic deference to agency decision-making.8" It
78 44 F.3d 1001, 1003, n. * (Fed. Cir. 1995). "Our agreement with the opinion of
the CIT does not extend to the suggestion that a routine classification dispute is entitled
to special deference under [Chevron]." Id.
79 112 F.3d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
80 Id. at 483-84.
81 See e.g., Blakley Corp. v. United States, 15 F. Supp. 2d 865 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1998); Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 2d 942 (Ct. Int'l Trade
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was not until 1999, that the Supreme Court finally intervened to
save the application of Chevron in customs law and shield the
Customs Service, once thought protected by that previous decision
of the High Court, from a persistent abusive judicial onslaught.82
IV. Haggar and the Resurgence of Deference in Customs Law
Until April 21, 1999, the federal Customs Courts continued to
resist the controlling nature of Chevron. The esteemed judges on
the CIT and CAFC tenaciously held on to the rules of Crystal
Clear83 and Rollerblade.84  Until either Congress or the Supreme
Court stepped in to elucidate the proper approach of judicial
review in light of the apparent conflict between 28 U.S.C. § 2639,
bolstered by Chevron, 28 U.S.C. § 2640, and 28 U.S.C. § 2643,
the customs judiciary inevitably would continue on its current
path. Much needed succor for the Customs Service arrived in
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.85 This was the first case
1999).
82 As one author noted in 1998: "Even though the Supreme Court has ruled in
Chevron that courts should accord agencies considerable deference, the Court of
International Trade is not extending administrators as much deference as they might
expect." UNAH, supra note 8, at 141.
83 Crystal Clear Indus. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
84 Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
85 526 U.S. 380 (1999). In this case, Haggar sought a refund of customs duties
paid on clothing shipped to the United States from a Mexican assembly facility. Under
the tariff schedule, HTSUS subheading 9802.00.80, if the articles were merely
assembled in Mexico, they would be entitled for a partial duty exemption. However,
Haggar performed an additional process on the clothing, which entailed chemically
pretreating and baking the items to maintain creases and avoid wrinkles. The Customs
Service determined this was not incidental, but rather an additional step in assembly
under 19 CFR § 10.16(c)(4), known as permapressing. Id. at 383-84. This additional
step would take the garments out of the duty exemption provisions. id. at 396. See also
William Funk, Supreme Court Addresses Chevron Issues in Several Cases, 24 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEwS 4, 5 (Summer 1999).
At the lower judicial levels, the Haggar case was one of the progeny following Crystal
Clear, refusing deference to Customs ruling in tariff classification matters. 938 F. Supp.
868, 875 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996), aff'd 127 F.3d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See Joseph I. Liebman, A Panel Discussion-Review of Customs and Trade
Developments at the CAFC with a Particular Emphasis on the Haggar Decision, 9 FED.
CIR. B.J. 247 (1999), for the legal community's concerns while awaiting the Supreme
Court's decision in Haggar.
By denying. .. customary deference to the Treasury regulations that interpret
the detailed classification provisions ... the Federal Circuit decision in this case
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
before the Supreme Court involving the Chevron-customs law
nexus.86 The Court's opinion in Haggar, written by Justice
Anthony Kennedy for the majority, basically declared that
Chevron deference applies to customs classification rules, hence
reversing the decisions of the CIT and CAFC.87 The Court held
that the "statutes authorizing customs classification regulations are
consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering
agency warrant judicial deference; and nothing in the regulation
itself persuades us that the agency intended the regulation to have
some lesser force and effect."88
The Court then tackled the ubiquitous de novo argument of the
Customs Courts in regard to tariff classification determinations.
The Court found de novo adjudication and Chevron deference not
to be incongruous.
A central theme in respondent's argument is that the tr'ial court
proceedings may be, as they were in this case, de novo, and
hence the court owes no deference to the regulation under
Chevron principles. . . . De novo proceedings presume a
foundation of law. The question here is whether the regulations
are part of that controlling law. Deference can be given to the
regulations without impairing the authority of the court to make
factual determinations, and to apply those determinations to the
law, de novo.89
At the decision's conclusion, the Court declared in fairly
strong language that:
The customs regulations may not be disregarded. Application of
would leave both importers and the Customs Service without effective guidance
for a wide range of transactions. If the agency's interpretative regulations were
deprived of any effect, the ultimate application of customs provisions could not
be determined until completion of a cumbersome, case-by-case inquiry to obtain
an ad hoc judicial 'balancing [of] the relevant factors.'
Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
86 "Chevron analysis is established in most areas of administrative law.
Nevertheless, its application to customs law in Haggar was a novel question." Claire R.
Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Unto the Breach: Reconciling Chevron Analysis
and De Novo Judicial Review after United States v. Haggar Apparel Company, 49 AM.
U. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2000).
87 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
88 Haggar, 526 U.S. at 390.
89 Id. at 391.
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the Chevron framework is the beginning of the legal analysis.
Like other courts, the Court of International Trade must, when
appropriate, give regulations Chevron deference. . . . The
expertise of the Court of International Trade ... guides it in
making complex determinations in a specialized area of law; it is
well positioned to evaluate customs, regulations and their
operation in light of the statutory mandate to determine if the
preconditions for Chevron deference are present. 90
Clearly, Haggar was a victory for the Customs Service. 9' The
decision indicated that Chevron deference to the customs laws is
"quite strong."92 However, the "remnants of Haggar likely will be
strewn throughout customs litigation in the future."9 3 The Haggar
decision appears narrowly tailored to customs regulations. In the
alternative, the decision left, to the dismay of Customs and the
delight of importers' attorneys, sufficientvagueness. It has been
pointed out that the Court's language in Haggar indicates that the
CIT and CAFC need only apply the deference doctrine in cases
involving regulations, i.e., those rules made into law either
legislatively or through informal processes, such as notice and
comment rulemaking.94 Just two years later, last spring, the
Supreme Court while attempting to clarify any ambiguities in the
aftermath of Haggar, may have actually set forth a maelstrom of
confusion and calls for further congressional involvement in
clarification.
90 Id. at 394.
91 Haggar appears to have tacitly overturned the decisions of the Court of Appeals
in Crystal Clear and Rollerblade. See Brief for Petitioner at 22, United States v. Mead
Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001) (No. 99-1434) (2000 WL 977426).
92 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 65, at 841.
93 Claire R. Kelly, Remnants of Recent Customs Litigation: Jurisdiction and
Statutory Interpretation, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 861, 873 (2001).
94 See Kelly & Reed, supra note 86, at 1187. The Supreme Court stated that "valid
regulations establish legal norms [and create controlling law, as do] controlling statutes,
rules, and judicial precedents." Haggar, 526 U.S. at 391. See also Kelly & Reed, supra
note 87, at 1187. "The Court did not mention other administrative interpretations that
may set norms. Nor did it include administrative interpretations other than regulations in
the list of authorities to which a trial court must conform its rulings (i.e., statutes, rules,
and judicial precedents)." Kelly & Reed, supra, note 86, at 1187.
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V. Mead: Clarity or Confusion in Customs Law?
Haggar pronounced a rule that regulations of the Customs
Service are accorded Chevron deference. In particular, when
Customs employs its gap-filling authority, the Court must give any
reasonable agency interpretation of a regulation or statute
"controlling weight."95 While appearing to elucidate the judicial
review powers of the CIT and CAFC in classification cases, the
decision, in fact, keeps the law unsettled. Evidence of this came
on June 18, 2001, when the Supreme Court handed down the
decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,96 considered by many
95 526 U.S. at 392. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
96 533 U.S. 218 (2001). This case focuses on the Customs Service's treatment and
interpretation of respondent's well-known day planners. The tariff schedule at issue falls
under the heading for "[r]egisters, account books, notebooks, order books, receipt books,
letter pads, memorandum pads, diaries, and similar articles". HTSUS subheading
4820.10. This subheading is further divided into two categories. Items deemed
"[d]iaries, notebooks and address books, ... memorandum pads, letter pads and similar
articles" were subject to a 4% tariff rate. All "others" were afforded duty-free status.
Between 1989 and 1993, Customs consistently treated Mead's day planners as "other."
In January 1993, however, Customs determined, through the issuance of a brief
headquarters ruling letter and, following Mead's protest, a more carefully reasoned letter,
that the items at issue were to be classified as "[d]iaries ... bound," hence subject to the
4% rate. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 224-25. Mead protested the decision under the
provisions of 19 C.F.R. § 174. Mead, 533 U.S. at 225.
The Court of International Trade upheld the classification determination of Customs.
Mead Corp. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (1998).
However, the CAFC reversed. Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304 (C.A. Fed.
1999). Relying on Haggar, which was decided by the Supreme Court three months
earlier, the appeals court conceded that under decisions like Rollerblade, the courts
"accorded Customs's classifications no deference." Id. at 1306. However, if a tariff
provision is ambiguous and Customs promulgates a regulation to clarify the provision,
Chevron deference is mandated. Id. The CAFC stressed that when a Customs regulation
follows the "procedural rigors" of notice and comment rulemaking under the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 553, the Haggar/Chevron rule has been satisfied as the regulations carry the
force of law. 185 F.3d at 1307.
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register .... The notice shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of the public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority
under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
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"to be a blockbuster administrative law decision." 97  While
certainly relying on the Haggar decision of deference to Customs
regulations, the majority of the Court, led by Justice David Souter,
affirmed the decision of the CAFC and found that tariff
classification ruling letters not promulgated under rulemaking
procedures do not deserve Chevron treatment.98 The Court held:
[An] administrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a
variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some
other indication of a comparable congressional intent. 99
The Court went on, that "in sum, classification rulings ... are
beyond the Chevron pale."' 0 Citing a decision of one year prior,
the Court held that classification rulings are synonymous with
"interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
Furthermore, "[aifter notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." 5 U.S.C. §
553(c) (2000).
On remand from the Supreme Court, the CAFC upheld its previous reversal of the CIT.
Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342 (Fall 2002).
97 William Funk, One of the Most Significant Opinions Ever Rendered? 27 ADMrN.
& REG. L. NEWS 8 (2001).
98 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226.
99 Id. at 226-27. Since the rendering of the Mead decision, courts have extended
the Chevron/Mead analysis beyond tariff classification cases. For example, see Koyo
Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001), Pesquera Mares Australes
Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and Thai Pineapple Canning
Indus. Corp. v. United States, 273 F.3d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2001), which are concerned with
the Department of Commerce's imposition of anti-dumping duties. In Pesquera Mares,
the CAFC touches on the potential confusion set forth under Mead. "We understand
Mead to clearly recognize that Chevron deference is not limited to regulations adopted
after notice-and-comment rulemaking. The line that Mead draws is not defined with
great clarity." 266 F.3d at 1380. See also U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270
F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001), which discusses the Chevron!
Mead rule in interpretation of Internal Revenue Service regulations.
100 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
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and enforcement guidelines,"'0' and hence, are outside of the
scope of Chevron. The Mead Court stressed, however, that
Customs ruling letters are not completely worthless from a judicial
standpoint, as the Skidmore balancing approach was resurrected.
1 12
Rather, such letters remain persuasive, as "Chevron did nothing to
eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may
merit some deference."'' 0 3  However, the Court points out that
while Customs decisions are presumed correct, the CIT retains its
authority of de novo review and congressional delegation has not
101 Id. (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). In
Christensen, the Court stated:
Here we. .. confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one
arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all
of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference.
529 U.S. at 587.
At issue in Christensen was whether or not an opinion letter from the Acting
Administrator of-the U.S Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division interpreting
certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act should receive Chevron deference.
Id. In light of the language of the preceding paragraph, the Court declined such status.
For more detailed analysis of classification rulings and similar articles, see Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41 DuKE L. J. 1311 (1992).
[U]nder the taxonomy of the APA, a rulemaking action that the agency wishes
to make binding upon affected persons must be either a legislative rule (which
binds legally) or an interpretive rule (which may bind practically). All other
substantive rulemaking documents-such as policy statements, guidances,
manuals, circulars, memoranda, 'bulletins, and the like-are in APA
terminology "policy statements," which the agency is not entitled to make
binding either as a legal matter or as a practical matter. . . . [B]ased on the
APA, . . . agencies observe legislative rulemaking procedures for any action in
the nature of rulemaking that is intended to impose mandatory obligations or
standards upon private parties, or that has that effect. To the extent that agency
pronouncements interpret specific statutory or regulatory language, this general
recommendation does not apply.
Id. at 1315.
102 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
.103 Id This remains much to the chagrin of Justice Antonin Scalia, who pronounced
in his dissent in Christensen that "Skidmore deference to authoritative agency views is an
anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give agency interpretations
(including interpretative regulations, as opposed to 'legislative rules') authoritative
effect. . . . That era came to an end with. our watershed decision in [Chevron]."
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mandated any special privilege to classification matters. 1°4 To the
majority, the absence of Congress's intent to elevate classification
rulings beyond deferential level as well as the CIT review
framework evidences a "counterbalanced" relationship between
legislative and judicial rulemaking.'05
The inherent nature of Customs rulings is also fundamental to
the argument of the majority. Customs officials must make
thousands of classification rulings every year.'0 6  The Court
stresses that elevating each of these rulings to the status of law is
"simply self-refuting.' ' 0 7 Customs rarely engages in notice-and-
comment rulemaking when issuing classification alterations as
these changes are intended only for the transaction at issue."8
104 Mead, 533 U.S. at 232. Under §. 1581(h), "classification rulings are on par with
the Secretary's rulings on 'valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry
requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters."' Id. at 232-33.
105 Id. at 232.
106 The Court points out that "46 different Customs offices throughout the country
issue 10,000 to 15,000 classification rulings each year." Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
107 Id.
108 Id. Under 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2002), "a ruling letter issued by the Customs
Service . .. represents the official position of the Customs Service with respect to the
particular transaction or issue described therein and is binding on all Customs Service
personnel in accordance with the provisions of this section until modified or revoked."
Furthermore,
a ruling letter is subject to modification or revocation without notice to any
person, expect the person to whom the letter was addressed. Accordingly, no
other person should rely on the ruling letter or assume that the principles of that
ruling will be applied in connection with any transaction other than the one
described in the letter.
19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c) (2002).
The Customs Modernization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-182, amended 19 U.S.C. §
1625(c) (2000) states that notice-and-comment rulemaking is required in regards to "a
proposed interpretive ruling or decision which would (1) modify. .. or revoke a prior
interpretive ruling or decision. . . or (2) have the effect of modifying the treatment
previously accorded by the Customs Service to substantially identical transactions."
These rulings or decisions need only be published in the Customs Bulletin, not the
Federal Register. Id. This new law did not come into effect until nearly one year after
the classification issue in this case arose. Hence "Customs was not required to-and, in
fact, did not-go through notice-and-comment procedures before changing the
classification of Mead's day planners." Brief for Respondent at 10, United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (No. 99-1434); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234. The
Court asserted that even the amendments of the 'Customs Modernization Act of 1993
would not alter its conclusions. Id. "The statutory changes reveal no new congressional
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Hence, to the Court, the volume of Customs decisions, their
restricted authority in the statutory framework, and inadequate
participation by interested parties in the rulemaking process
indicate a rather limited legislative understanding, well below the
threshold of lawmaking.
The sole dissent of Justice Antonin Scalia is both sardonic and
thorough." 9 The venerable jurist asserts that with the majority
holding
[w]e will be sorting out the consequences of the Mead doctrine,
which has today replaced the Chevron doctrine, for years to
come. I would adhere to our established jurisprudence, defer to
the reasonable interpretation the Customs Service has given to
the statute it is charged with enforcing, and reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.' 10
He continues:
As to principle: The doctrine of Chevron - that all authoritative
agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with
administering deserve deference - was rooted in a legal
presumption of congressional intent, important to the division of
powers between the Second and Third Branches. When,
Chevron said, Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to
be administered by an executive agency, it is presumed that
Congress meant to give the agency discretion, within the limits
of reasonable interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be
resolved. By committing enforcement to the statute to an agency
rather than the courts, Congress committed its initial and primary
objective of treating classification decisions generally as rulemaking with force of law,
nor do they suggest any intent to create a Chevron patchwork of classification rulings,
some with force of law, some without." Id.
109 Some of the Justice's witty gems include:
[T]he Court now resurrects, in full force, the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore
deference .... The Court has largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with
that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared
by litigants who want to know what to expect): th' ol' 'totality of the
circumstances' test.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia advises those reading his dissent to
"buy stock in the GPO," id. at 246, as he foresees a dramatic increase in informal
rulemaking by the Customs Service to satisfy the Mead test; and he describes the
majority's Mead test as "wonderfully imprecise" and of "utter flabbiness." Id. at 245.
110 Id. at 239-40.
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interpretation to that branch as well."'
Scalia, the textualist master, sees that while formal
adjudication procedures are prescribed, like under 5 U.S.C. §§ 554
& 556, informal rulemaking, such as notice-and-comment
procedures, is usually authorized but not required." 2 Agencies,
empowered with such broad and flexible legislative mandates,
should prevail under Chevron authority and deference. Scalia
declares that forcing agency administrators to obtain formal
adjudication (i.e., from the courts) for ambiguities arising now and
in the future "makes no sense.""' 3  While the majority has
"breath[ed] new life into the anachronism of Skidmore," this
approach is misguided."4 Scalia believes this decision to be a relic
of simpler times. In 1944, the year of the Skidmore decision, the
American bureaucracy was only beginning to burgeon.
But in an era when federal statutory law administered by federal
agencies is pervasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or
unintended) that those statutes contain are innumerable, totality-
of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for
uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation. To
condemn a vast body of agency action to that regime. . . is
irresponsible. 1
5
Scalia concludes his diatribe with a thorough analysis of the
inconsistent case law handed down by his brothers and sisters on
I11 Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). Justice Scalia's dedication to Chevron runs
strong. During a 1989 speech at Duke University School of Law, Scalia "note[d] that the
capacity of the Chevron approach to accept changes in agency interpretation
ungrudgingly seems to me one of the strongest indications that the Chevron approach is
correct." Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DuKE L. J. 511,518. He continued,
I tend to think... that in the long run Chevron will endure and be given its full
scope - not so much because it represents a rule that is easier to follow and
thus easier to predict. . . , but because it more accurately reflects the reality of
government, and thus more adequately serves its needs.
Id. at 521.
112 Mead, 533 U.S. at 243. See also William S. Jordan 1II, United States v. Mead:
Complicating the Delegation Dance, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11425 (2001) (" '[l]nformal
rulemaking' generally refers to notice-and-comment rulemaking.").
113 Mead, 533 U.S. at 244.
114 Id. at 250.
115 Id. at 249.
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the Court in recent years, most notably the Christensen and
Nationsbank cases.1 6  In the previously mentioned case of
Christensen v. Harris County, the Court ruled that opinion letters
and other informal agency decisions are not within the realm of
Chevron."' In his Mead dissent, however, Scalia stresses that
what ruled the day in Christensen was that the Department of
Labor's opinion was clearly erroneous on its face, forcing it
outside of Chevron."8  The judiciary's statements regarding
opinion letters and other informal interpretations are mere dictum,
irrelevant to the Court's holding." 9
At the dissent's conclusion, Scalia looks at the 1995 case of
Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co.. '2 This decision provides a strong basis for the argument in
support of ruling letters enjoying Chevron treatment. In
Nationsbank, the Court found a. letter from the Comptroller of
Currency to be a reasonable and permissible reading of the statute
at issue and therefore deserving of Chevron treatment. 12' The
Mead majority cites Nationsbank and concedes that in that case
Chevron deference was granted despite the absence of
administrative formality, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 22 Souter declares, however, that "the fact that the
tariff classification here was not a product of such formal process
alone does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron.' 23
Oddly, the lack of a rulemaking procedure in the tariff
classification seems to be at the crux of the majority's decision.
Further, Scalia declares that the Mead reasoning "makes [the]
decision one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the
116 Id. at 255-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Not surprising, Scalia,
while concurring with the majority, found the Department of Labor's letter deserving of
Chevron deference, if reasonable. Scalia found the opinion an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute at issue.
118 Mead, 533 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)..
120 Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995).
121 Id. at 254.
122 Mead, 533 at 230.
123 Id.
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Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action."'2 4
He forecasts: "Its consequences will be enormous, and almost
uniformly bad."' 25 While this pessimism has yet to make manifest
a flood of judicial, legislative, and administrative disorder, the
majority's seeming disregard of history, law, and judicial economy
will inevitably produce an environment of animus between the
courts and the Customs Service.
VI. Analysis and Conclusions
The author of this article is inclined to favor the arguments put
forth by Scalia.'26 The decision rendered in Mead, while
appearing to elucidate any ambiguities remaining in the aftermath
of Haggarand the customs regulation versus ruling letter (or
notice-and-comment procedures versus the absence of such)
dichotomy, possibly has unleashed confusion affecting customs
law. The majority in Mead, in essence set up a two-tier system of
judicial review in administrative law: that of Skidmore
persuasiveness and Chevron deference. It had appeared that since
the inception of Chevron, the Skidmore approach was relegated to
the annals of history. However, under Mead, Skidmore was
brought back to life like a jurisprudential Lazarus. As stated in the
last sentence of the previous section, I would argue that this
reprise of the old rule is violative of history, law, and judicial
management.
As pointed out by one author and cited in the Scalia dissent in
Mead, "consistent with the Chevron methodology, and has long
been the rule in customs cases, customs regulations are sustained
if they represent reasonable interpretations of the statute.' 27
Chevron does not provide the Customs Service carte blanche
authority in classification rulings. Rather, the decision, while
giving broad discretion, certainly tempers and confines that power
within a regime of reason and "permissible construction."' 28 One
124 Nationsbank, 513 U.S. at 260.
125 Id.
126 For an approach supported by the author of this paper, see also Carla Garcia-
Benitez, The "Deference to the Agency" Doctrine: To What Extent Should it Apply to the
Customs Service's Interpretation of a Tariff Term in Classification Cases?, 20 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 577, 580-583 (1995).
127 REED, supra note 6, at 289; see Mead, 533 U.S. at 260.
128 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983).
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should review the Chevron test again. In sum, the two prongs
consist of: (1) the call for the presence of a clear congressional or
statutory mandate, 129 and (2) in the absence of unambiguity, the
creation of a reasonable assumption of agency correctness in
interpretation. 130
For classification concerns, the rulings of the Customs Service
appear to usually satisfy the first prong, in that "if the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court...
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."'31 Various statutes within the cstoms legal framework
show a clear legislative intent to imply an instruction to the
judiciary to defer to agency decisions in light of Chevron. These
statutes indicate and codify Congress's faith and reliance in the
Customs Service as the guardians of import regulation in this
country.
For example, under 19 U.S.C. § 1202, "[t]he Secretary of the
Treasury is hereby authorized to issue rules and regulations
governing the admission of articles under the provisions of the
tariff schedules."' 32 Furthermore, Congress has mandated that:
[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall establish and promulgate
such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law
(including regulations establishing procedures for the issuance
of binding rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise
concerned), and may disseminate such information as may be
necessary to secure a just, impartial, and uniform appraisement
of imported merchandise and the classification and assessment
of duties thereon at the various ports of entry.'133
Congress has provided a broad faculty to Customs through a
catch-all provision, which states that "[i]n addition to the specific
powers conferred [under Chapter 19 of the U.S.C.] the Secretary
of Treasury is authorized to make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 131
Certainly, thousands of import transactions occur daily at this
129 See id. at 842-44.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000) (general note 20 of the HTSUS).
133 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2000).,
134 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (2000).
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nation's ports of entry. 13' To consider the decisions of individual
agents, regardless of their level of expertise, as embodying law is
certainly beyond the vision of Chevron, Congress, or common
sense. However, in Mead, the ruling letter at issue was sent forth
by the Director of the Commercial Rulings Branch of Customs's
Office of Regulations and Rulings. 3 6  The majority in Mead
indicates that their decision hinges on the origins of the letter. 137 It
is true that the ruling letter did not come directly from the desk of
the Secretary of the Treasury or the Commissioner of the Customs
Service. However, one certainly could argue that the Director's
decision is that of the Department of Treasury's agent, proxy, or
delegate. The necessity for bureaucratic efficiency and notions of
human ability would dictate that the Commissioner or Secretary
cannot review the 10,000 to 15,000 rulings issued by Customs
annually. The delegation of authority is reasonable, economical,
and realistic. To compel Customs to engage in notice-and-
comment rulemaking for every classification ruling is overly
burdensome, both to the courts and the agency. As Scalia
portends, thousands of rulings will equate to thousands of
rulemaking procedures.'38
Congress's bestowal is concise and clear. Customs has been
given the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
its duties. The mandate of Customs is certainly broad, but absent a
congressional decision to the contrary, its broad purview remains.
The legal current under which the Mead ruling letter was made
effective deserves Chevron deference. For whatever reason, the
Mead majority believed that a bureaucracy which administers best
135 According to recent statistics from the government, on an average day, the
Customs Service examines 1.3 million passengers, 2,642 aircraft, 50,889
trucks/containers, 355,004 vehicles, 588 vessels, and 64,923 entries. U.S. Customs
Service, A Day in the Life of the U.S. Customs Service (Oct. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.customs.gov/about/weare.htm.
136 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256 (2001).
137 While the majority defends its holding on the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process, or absence thereof, in this case the Court concedes in a footnote that had the
Commissioner or Secretary himself issued the ruling letter a different result may have
occurred. 533 U.S. at 237, n. 19. The " 'highest level' at Customs is the source of the
regulation in Haggar, the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of the Secretary
of the Treasury. . . . [In Mead, the] Commissioner did not issue the Headquarters
ruling .... This explains why the Court has not accepted Justice Scalia's position." Id.
138 Mead, 533 U.S. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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administers least. The Mead decision presents a sublime case
study in the canons of textualism and loose constructionism. The
majority and Scalia seem to be following both simultaneously, as
they selectively pick and choose to adhere to the strict language of
the APA, the Customs statutes, and the hybrid test of rigidity and
flexibility of Chevron and its progeny.'39
In conclusion, Mead seems to have created more questions and
uncertainty. Chevron and a liberal reading of Haggar indicated a
harbingering of concretion in customs classification law. Instead,
Mead has now forced the Customs Service to either endeavor in an
ultimately endless cycle of APA-style rulemaking or rampant
litigation to obtain judicial acknowledgment. Customs has
proposed new rules to 19 C.F.R. § 177 granting the agency greater
leeway to avoid the cumbersome rules of the APA.140 While I am
in no way asserting, in essence, that means of skirting due process
are laudable in light of the dramatic increase in international trade,
the judiciary must ensure a viable and realistic framework based
on stare decisis and clear congressional intent. That paradigm was
established under Chevron and Haggar. Unfortunately, Mead has
opaqued what was arguably a clearer vision of customs law.
Without more decided authorization from Capitol Hill, the
detrimental aftermath of Mead will inevitably burden an already
beleaguered federal bureaucracy and judiciary.
139 For example, the majority cites the APA notice-and-comment rulemaking
provisions, yet seemingly ignores the first part of the Chevron test. Scalia, the stalwart
of conservatism and textual interpretation, prefers the simplicity of Chevron, while
paying little deference to APA procedures and relegating apparent rulings of the Court in
prior cases to mere dicta.
140 For example, under the proposed rules, Customs must provide notice-and-
comment procedures following rulings that have "the effect of modifying or revoking the
treatment previously accorded by Customs to substantially identical transactions."
Treatment Previously Accorded to Substantially Identical Transactions, 66 Fed. Reg.
37370, 37388 (proposed July 17, 2001). However, the publication and issuance
requirement is
inapplicable in circumstances in which a Customs position is modified, revoked, or
otherwise materially affected by operation of law or by publication pursuant to
other legal authority or by other appropriate action taken by Customs in furtherance
of an order, instruction, or other policy decision of another governmental agency or
entity pursuant to statutory or delegated authority. Such circumstances include, but
are not limited to, the following: . . . (iii). .. issuance of a decision or policy
determination pursuant to authority delegated by the President.
Exceptions to Notice Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. at 37388-89 (proposed July 17, 2001).
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